Everything feels like a scam now, and that feeling is worth trusting.
It’s not paranoia or nostalgia. Something real is happening, and most people are pointed at the wrong culprit.
One distortion, a thousand points of contact
Everything feels like a scam because the unit everything is priced in loses value on purpose, year after year. When the money itself leaks, everyone holding it has reason to stop holding it. Whoever sets a price passes the loss on, and whoever doesn’t is left holding it. You meet that scramble at a thousand points of contact, the chocolate bar that shrank, the £6 coffee, the subscription that creeps up while the service gets worse, the pay rise that somehow left you poorer, the fees charged for what used to be included, the sense that saving is for suckers and everyone you know is flipping something. Each contact reads as a separate little con. It’s actually one distortion at the money layer, spreading through everything built on top of it.
What should be happening
Technology makes things cheaper to produce. Your phone swallowed the camera, the film, the postage, the map, the CD collection, the torch.1 In a free market, under a money nobody can add to, those gains show up as falling prices, because when one producer gets more efficient, a competitor copies the method and undercuts them until the saving reaches you. Where nobody can copy it, the saving stays with the business. Everywhere else, the natural state of a market full of improving technology is that your money slowly buys more. You work the same hours. Life should be getting cheaper.
So everyone asks “why is everything so expensive?” The better question is “where did the saving go?”
Why the system can’t allow it
Nearly all our money is created through lending, so nearly every pound in existence is also someone’s debt.2 Those debts are fixed in pounds. If prices broadly fall and nothing is done to stop it, wages eventually follow, but the mortgage payment doesn’t shrink.
A system built on this much debt can take a slow fall that comes with better tools. In that fall it’s the cost of making things that drops, and pay drifts down slowly behind it, so the money to meet a fixed payment is still there. What it can’t take is a sudden fall in the prices credit pushed up, houses first, because then the losses spread through the banks. In that fall it’s the lending that has stopped, so incomes and the house fall together and at once, and the fixed payment is hit from both sides in the same year. Houses come first because people buy them with borrowed money. The debt takes a bigger bite of every income. And where the loan was written against a house, the house is worth less too, so the bank stands to lose more on that loan. So every time a sudden fall in those prices threatens, the system is rescued with new money, and the rescues keep getting bigger.
In between, governments and central banks create more money and credit to keep prices rising by about 2% a year, deliberately, as policy.3 Central banks publish why they aim there. They want room to cut interest rates in a downturn, they know wages resist falling, and they say the official measure of prices overstates the rise.4 Those are the reasons they give, and the debts aren’t among them. The debts show up in the rescues, not in the everyday 2%.
Technology should be making your cost of living fall by about as much as output per hour of work grows, a point or two a year on the published productivity figures.5 Instead policy pushes prices up by about 2%.6 The real gap between what you should pay and what you do pay is bigger than the headline inflation number, because the fall you should have had is hidden inside that number. No official statistic reports that fall, because statistics measure what happened, and this is the distance between what happened and what should have happened. That gap has two parts. One is the saving you never received as lower prices, and the other is the rise you paid on top of it. Both compound, year after year, for decades.
The saving didn’t all vanish. Part of it reached you as higher pay, late and unevenly.7 Part of it was never made, because cheap credit kept alive firms that would otherwise have closed and freed their workers, their buildings, and their machines for better uses, so some output was never produced and nobody holds it. The rest was transferred. New money usually enters the system through financial markets and cheap loans, so the people closest to it catch the gains first.8 Banks, governments, people who already own assets. House and share prices rise while your wages lag behind.9 The money you hold stands in for hours of work already done, and what those hours will buy is set by prices when you spend. When money and credit are created faster than the economy makes things, your stored hours buy less. So there is a scam, in the strict sense of value taken without consent, by a method almost nobody is shown. But it’s one scam, at the base of the system, not a million little ones.
Why it feels like a million little ones
It feels like a million little cons because the small businesses you deal with are being squeezed much the way you are.10 The café’s rent, ingredients, wages, and card fees all rise, but customers revolt at a £7 flat white, so the cup shrinks, the beans get cheaper, the staff get cut. Shrinkflation is cutting the size or quality of a product instead of raising its sticker price. It’s a price rise wearing a disguise, and that’s what makes it feel dishonest. Stretched staff read as a company that stopped caring. Auto-renewing subscriptions and drip-priced airline seats read as traps. A drip-priced seat is a low headline price with fees added at every step. The auto-renewals and the drip pricing aren’t the squeeze, because they work on how people read a price, and they were measured and regulated before the recent cost rise.11 Those two are a sales trick, a bet that you’ll read the first number and not the last. The smaller cup, the thinner service, and the cut staff are the same squeeze being passed down the line to the last person who can’t pass it further, which is you.
Then there’s the change in how people behave, and I think this is the part you’re really smelling. When money loses value by design, sitting still means falling behind. Cash in the bank is a guaranteed loss in real terms, so ordinary people are pushed to take risks they wouldn’t otherwise take, just to stand still.12 When taking those risks becomes an ordinary thing to do, culture follows. Side hustles, day trading, meme coins, courses about selling courses. The payoff for patient, honest work falls against the payoff for owning assets, and money set aside loses ground while it waits, so the tilt runs toward grabbing something now. People can feel that shift in the people around them even when they can’t name the cause. A society’s honesty rests on its incentives as well as its morals. When the measuring stick itself can be bent, bending things pays better than building things. The 2% target is published, but what it does isn’t.13 Nobody shows you the fall it had to cancel first, so the saver can’t see the size of what the target takes.
And at the top, the pattern is out in the open. A bank that gambles and wins keeps the bonuses. A bank that gambles and loses gets rescued with newly created money, while the small firm down the road goes under. Big companies borrow at rates you aren’t offered and buy up their competitors. Losses get socialised, gains stay private. Lobbying for the policies that keep asset prices rising beats building, so that’s what gets funded. People watch that and conclude the game is rigged. They’re right. They just usually aim the anger at the wrong level, the landlord, the manager, the other political tribe, rather than the design that rewards all of them for behaving this way.
Why now, specifically
It feels worse now because the gap keeps growing. Technology’s downward pull on the cost of making things compounds, and the push behind it keeps getting stronger, because the tools are improving faster than they did, as software and now AI spread into more of the economy. You won’t see that in the official productivity figures yet.14 With the target fixed at 2%, the bigger the fall technology would deliver, the bigger the offset needed to cancel it. That’s why each rescue is bigger than the last, from hundreds of billions of dollars of government spending and bond-buying in 2008 to trillions in 2020.15 Between 2000 and early 2018 the world added roughly 185 trillion dollars of debt to buy about 46 trillion of growth.16 The bigger the dose, the bigger the transfer, the more distortion leaks into daily life, and the worse everything feels. Your instinct that “it wasn’t like this” isn’t memory playing tricks.
And there’s a modern amplifier. When an app is free, you’re the product, so even your idle attention is being farmed and sold, and that traces back to the same money, because cheap money and ad models are what made those platforms giant. That completes the feeling that every single interaction now has an angle.
Greed, wars, and supply shocks can’t explain it
Corporate greed is the popular answer, and it fails a simple test. Greed is nothing new, so the wanting isn’t what changed. What people point at when they say greed is margins [the profit on each sale], and margins did change, so the question is what let them widen.17 What changed is the restraint. In an honest system, a greedy firm that overcharges gets undercut by a hungrier rival. Cheap credit and inflated asset values protect the firms already in place from that discipline, so the greedy get shielded instead of competed away. That’s the rescued bank. That’s the competitor bought with cheap credit. Wars and supply shocks are real too, but a shock moves prices for a year or two. It can’t explain a fifty-year slide in what a pound buys while production got radically more efficient.18 What runs underneath all of it is the expanding money. It has been there the whole time, and it grows with each decade.
And the clearest sign that the pound price is telling you mostly about the pound, not about the house, is what happens when you measure in a money nobody can create more of. Over the multi-year windows so far, most prices have fallen in bitcoin. A house that cost around 300 bitcoin fell to a small fraction of that within a few years, even as its pound price climbed. Same house, different ruler. The whole of that fall is bitcoin buying more as adoption grew, not the house getting cheaper to make. In pounds the house was moving the other way, working against the fall rather than causing it, so read the direction, not the size. The gains from better tools are real, they’re just being absorbed before they reach you.
Inside the scramble
The scam feeling is accurate perception. It’s what a slowly debasing unit feels like from the inside. Everyone scrambling, and the scramble indistinguishable from universal dishonesty. The reason I ended up at bitcoin is that it’s the first money whose whole future supply is fixed and published in advance, which anyone can check by running the software, so it’s the first ruler that can’t be stretched, for as long as it stays decentralised and secure.19 In that unit the whole picture inverts. Prices fall, saving works, patience pays.
But the core answer stands on its own. It’s not that everyone became a crook. The money everyone is forced to use rewards crook-like behaviour, and people respond to rewards. One scam, not a million. Fix the money layer at its base, and most of the little ones lose their reason to exist.
Sources 19
What this essay rests on, as checked on 1 October 2026.
- 1 CIPA, Press release on camera shipments, 2022 figures: Shipments rose "from 5.1 million units to 121.5 million units" by 2010, then "declined by 4.2% in 2022 to 8 million units"; 8,011,598 units in 2022.
- 2 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”, published 14 March 2014: "the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans"; "The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or 'quantitative easing'."
- 3 Federal Reserve, FOMC statement of longer-run goals and policy strategy, 25 January 2012: "The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate." European Central Bank, Press release, 8 July 2021, "ECB's Governing Council approves its new monetary policy strategy": "The Governing Council considers that price stability is best maintained by aiming for a 2% inflation target over the medium term. This target is symmetric, meaning negative and positive deviations of inflation from the target are equally undesirable." Bank of England, Web page, "Inflation and the 2% target": "The Government sets us a 2% inflation target"; "The Government has set us a target of keeping inflation at 2%".
- 4 European Central Bank, "An overview of the ECB's monetary policy strategy", 2021 strategy review: "Three additional factors ... call for a sufficient inflation buffer", the buffer giving room for "interest rate cuts", allowing for "measurement bias" and "taking account of downward nominal wage rigidities". Bank of Canada, "Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target: Background Information", November 2011: "In addition to the risks associated with the ZLB, two other potential costs of moving to an inflation target lower than 2 per cent were identified ... : measurement bias in the CPI and downward nominal wage rigidities." The Bank adds that it views neither of those two as a significant impediment to a lower target.
- 5 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the St. Louis Fed's FRED database, Series OPHNFB, "Nonfarm Business Sector: Labor Productivity (Output per Hour) for All Workers", index 2017=100, seasonally adjusted: Annual index (2017=100): 72.455 in 2000, 86.758 in 2007, 103.636 in 2019 — 2.6% a year from 2000 to 2007 and 1.5% a year from 2007 to 2019. Office for National Statistics, Series LZVB, "UK Whole Economy: Output per hour worked SA: Index 2023 = 100", released 18 August 2026: Index (2023=100), seasonally adjusted: 92.6 in 2008 to 100.0 in 2023, about 0.6% a year. That UK pace is slower than a point or two a year.
- 6 Bank of England, Web page, "Inflation and the 2% target": "The Government sets us a 2% inflation target"; "The Government has set us a target of keeping inflation at 2%". European Central Bank, "An overview of the ECB's monetary policy strategy", 2021 strategy review: "at this juncture the Governing Council considers that price stability is best maintained by aiming for a two per cent inflation target over the medium term" (printed in words as "two per cent").
- 7 Pessoa and Van Reenen, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 1246, October 2013, “Decoupling of Wage Growth and Productivity Growth? Myth and Reality”: “In the UK net decoupling is basically zero: both wages and productivity rose by the same amount since 1972.” UK, 1972 to 2010: “real productivity grew by 114 per cent” and “median real wages by 72 per cent”. Stansbury and Summers, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24165, 2017, “Productivity and Pay: Is the link broken?”: “over 1973-2016, one percentage point higher productivity growth has been associated with 0.7 to 1 percentage points higher median and average compensation growth”; “other factors orthogonal to productivity have been acting to suppress typical compensation”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED series MEPAINUSA672N, annual values, 1974 to 2023: $28,720 in 1974 rising to $43,310 in 2023, in 2024 dollars.
- 8 Bank of England, Explainer, “Quantitative easing”: “we can create money digitally in the form of ‘central bank reserves’. We use these reserves to buy bonds”; “lower government bond yields feed through to lower interest rates on household mortgages”. Cantillon, “Essai sur la nature du commerce en général”, published 1755: Written between 1730 and 1734, published in French in 1755; the essay describes new money raising prices unevenly, first for those who receive it.
- 9 Miles and Monro, Bank of England Staff Working Paper 837, 20 December 2019, “UK house prices and three decades of decline in the risk-free real interest rate”: “the rise in house prices relative to incomes between 1985 and 2018 can be more than accounted for by the substantial decline in the real risk-free interest rate observed over the period”. Bank of England, Explainer, “Quantitative easing”: “When we buy bonds, their price tends to increase”; “QE increases the price of financial assets other than bonds, such as equities.”
- 10 Bank of England, Agents' summary of business conditions, December 2025: “Many firms continue to report squeezed profit margins and ongoing efficiency initiatives as mitigation”; “More firms report not replacing leavers”.
- 11 Financial Conduct Authority, General insurance pricing practices market study, final report, 22 September 2020: “Final Report 22/09/2020”; “Firms use complex techniques to identify consumers who are more likely to renew with them. Firms then increase prices to these customers at renewal each year”, and make it “more difficult to cancel automatic renewal”. Gabaix and Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006: “We show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets, even in markets with costless advertising, and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies.”
- 12 Bank for International Settlements, BIS Working Papers No 363, “The Liquidation of Government Debt”: “For the advanced economies in our sample, real interest rates were negative roughly ½ of the time during 1945-1980.” The paper's window is fixed at 1945 to 1980, the rates are on government debt, and they were negative roughly half the time, not always.
- 13 Bank of England, “Inflation and the 2% target”: “To keep inflation low and stable, the Government sets us an inflation target of 2%.” Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM Treasury, Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England, monetary policy remit, 26 November 2025: “I hereby re-confirm the inflation target as 2 per cent as measured by the 12-month increase in the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). The inflation target of 2 per cent is symmetric and applies at all times.” Federal Reserve, Federal Open Market Committee, “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy”, 25 January 2012: “The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate.”
- 14 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, April 2021, “The U.S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry-level analysis”: "Labor productivity—defined as output per labor hour—has grown at a below-average rate since 2005, representing a dramatic reversal of the above-average growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s."
- 15 United States Congress, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Public Law 110-343, enacted October 3, 2008: "An Act To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets"; authority to buy up to $700 billion of troubled assets; enacted October 3, 2008. Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 748, CARES Act, Public Law 116-136, enacted March 2020: "The CARES Act appropriates roughly $2.2 trillion of spending, tax breaks, loans, and other resources over the next decade." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, via FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Total assets of the Federal Reserve, weekly Wednesday levels, series WALCL: Millions of U.S. dollars: 905,253 at 2008-09-03 rising to 2,254,983 at 2008-12-17; 4,241,507 at 2020-03-04 rising to 7,168,936 at 2020-06-10.
- 16 World Bank, World Development Indicators, GDP (current US$), World, series NY.GDP.MKTP.CD: World GDP (current US$): 2000, 33,965,806,441,911.9; 2018, 87,310,840,056,717.8. That is growth of about $53.3 trillion from 2000 to 2018, not about 46 trillion. International Monetary Fund, Debt Dynamics, IMF Annual Report 2022: "Overall borrowing jumped by 28 percentage points to 256 percent of GDP in 2020." The page prints no dollar total of global debt and no figure for debt added between 2000 and early 2018.
- 17 De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger, Quarterly Journal of Economics paper, 2020: Aggregate markups: 21% above marginal cost in 1980, rising to 61%.
- 18 Office for National Statistics, CPI INDEX 00: ALL ITEMS 2015=100, series D7BT, dataset MM23: CPI index (2015=100): 49.6 in 1988 rising to 142.3 in 2026 H1, a rise of about 187%. The series printed here starts in 1988 and ends in 2026, not a fifty-year window.
- 19 bitcoin.org, Frequently Asked Questions: "only 21 million bitcoins will ever be created"; "running a full node, which offers the highest level of verification". The page carries nothing on the fixed issuance schedule.