People keep asking where all the printed money goes.
The way it’s normally asked hides the answer. New money doesn’t get used up like fuel. Every new pound that exists is in someone’s hands right now. So there are two questions underneath that one. Who gets to spend the new money first? And whose pounds quietly shrink to pay for it? Answer both of those and you’ve answered it.
New money enters the economy through a few specific doors, mostly bank lending and central bank purchases of bonds.1 Because of where those doors are, the money lands in financial markets and property first. It pushes up the prices of the things people use to store wealth, houses and shares above all.2 Only later, after it has passed through many hands, does it reach wages, and by then prices have already moved. So the printed money goes into asset prices, and the value it carries comes out of wages and cash savings. It’s a transfer, and nobody posts you the bill. The bill arrives as prices.
How the money is actually born
Almost none of it is notes from a printing press.3 It’s created in two main ways, and the door it comes in through decides who gets it first.4
Banks create money when they lend.5 When a bank gives you a £300,000 mortgage, it doesn’t move some saver’s money into your account. It creates a brand new deposit that didn’t exist the day before. Most money in the economy was born this way, and in Britain lending against houses is the largest single kind of bank lending, the door that stays open in every year.6 That’s your first clue about where it all goes.
In a crisis, and well outside one, the central bank creates money directly.7 That’s quantitative easing, the central bank creating new electronic money and using it to buy bonds.8 The Bank of England creates the money and buys government bonds from big investors such as pension funds and insurers. Those investors now hold cash they didn’t plan to hold, and from 2009 to 2021 it paid them almost nothing.9 The first thing that cash buys is corporate bonds [loans to companies].10 And when the Bank’s buying leaves government bonds paying less, a company’s future profits and a flat’s future rents are worth more today, because the safe return that money could get instead has fallen. So share and property prices rise over the same years.11 The companies that sold those bonds have borrowed the cash cheaply, and much of it goes on buying back their own shares or buying rivals. So the new money still reaches shares, one hand later. The new money’s first stop is financial markets because that’s where it was delivered.
There’s a third door, government spending funded by borrowing that the central bank then buys up. Furlough and the Covid support went through it. In crisis years more new money comes through that door than through bank lending, and in 2020 and 2021 far more. Of the three, it’s the one that points at ordinary spending. It’s why 2021 and 2022 finally saw shop prices jump after a decade in which people kept asking why all the money creation hadn’t caused inflation.12 It had. When the new money went to markets, asset prices rose. When it finally went to households, food and energy prices rose.13 Blocked supply chains, and then the price of gas, pushed in the same direction.14
Why first in line wins
Whoever receives new money first gets to spend it at today’s prices. This has a name, the Cantillon effect. The people closest to new money benefit at the expense of the people furthest from it. It’s the heart of the question. The order of arrival decides who wins.
The bank funds itself at the Bank of England’s rate or cheaper and buys assets at today’s prices, and the money it creates when it lends goes into a house at today’s price. The pension fund that sold its bonds buys corporate bonds at today’s prices.15 The company that sold those bonds buys a competitor, or buys back its own shares. Each hand the money passes through bids prices a little higher. The effect takes roughly a year to eighteen months to show up, and it shows up in whatever the money is being spent on.16
In an ordinary year most of the new money is being spent on assets, so asset prices move first. Wages are behind all of it, so by the time a receptionist’s pay review comes round, her rent, her food, and her energy have already gone up. She gets a 3% rise and an 8% rise in the cost of living. Nobody took a pound out of her account. The transfer happened entirely through prices. The decision behind it is on the record, the Bank of England has published an estimate of who gained from its own bond buying, and the official statisticians publish how much faster prices rose for poorer households when food and energy led the rise.17 But no record joins those halves or calls the result a transfer, so the person who paid is never shown a bill.
Rising prices and falling real wages are the same event seen from two seats. The receptionist’s wage fell behind because the new money reaches wages late. The gap is where the new money’s buying power came from.
Where it settles
Follow the chain far enough and the money pools in whatever people use to store wealth. Houses most of all.18 Banks lend new money into property, and when cash is losing value, people park their wealth in things that are hard to make more of. So a house takes on a second job. It’s shelter, plus a savings account. The extra price it carries for that second job is called a monetary premium, the part of its price that comes from people using it to store value rather than to live in it. Decades of money creation are stored in that premium. It’s a big part of why a house in Britain costs a far higher multiple of a salary than it did a generation ago, even though technology has made most goods cheaper to make.19
Between 2000 and early 2018 the world added roughly 185 trillion dollars of new debt and got roughly 46 trillion dollars of growth for it. That’s about four dollars of new debt for every dollar of new growth, and each new dollar of debt produces less new output than the one before. The gap went into raising the price of things that already existed, houses that were already built, shares in companies that already traded, and into paying the interest on the debt from earlier rounds.
Part of the state’s funding runs through the third door too. In 2019 every American corporation together earned about 2.4 trillion dollars in profit before tax, while in 2020 alone America’s stock of money grew by about 3.7 trillion dollars.20 You could have taxed away every dollar of every corporate profit and not matched the newly created money. In Britain’s crisis years the gap between what the state spent and what it raised in tax was bridged mainly by new money, because the Bank of England bought government bonds on a scale close to the whole of that gap. Across the years since 2009 most of the gap was bridged by selling debt to savers, and the Bank has been selling its holdings back since 2022. The part bridged by new money is paid for through prices, and it passes no vote. The part bridged by borrowing is paid for through prices too, in part. That’s because for most of those years the interest that the lenders were paid was held below the rate prices rose, so the savers who lent were paid back in pounds that bought less.
Since the question is where it all goes, some of it goes abroad. This is strongest for the dollar, because the world holds and trades in it.21 The world’s demand for dollars spreads the cost of new dollars across the savings held in them, so the pressure shows up in weaker countries’ currencies and import bills before it shows up in American shop prices.22 Part of the bill for a reserve currency’s money creation is paid by people who never saw any of the money.
What the order of arrival explains
Inequality stops looking like a fault in the system and starts looking like the delivery route. The system moves buying power from late receivers to early receivers every round. Skill matters, but the gap between asset owners and wage earners widens on its own, by place in the line. The order of arrival also explains why so many people now feel forced to invest. When money loses value year after year, a saver has to take risk just to stand still. And each crisis needs a bigger dose than the last. Technology keeps pushing down what it takes to make things, and the debt piles higher with every round. That debt is fixed in pounds, and what it can’t take is a sudden fall in the prices credit pushed up, houses first. So every time a sudden fall in the prices credit pushed up threatens, the system is rescued with new money, and the rescues keep getting bigger.
What people say back
“It paid for furlough and hospitals.” Some of it reached people directly and it mattered. In 2020 and 2021 more new money came through the government’s door than through bank lending. In an ordinary year the door that stays open is lending against houses, and the money it creates goes into houses first.23 And even the part that reached households was paid for by shrinking every existing pound rather than by a tax anyone voted for.
“Wages catch up in the end.” Wages arrive late because of where the doors are, and that lag is the transfer. To catch up to prices that already moved is to arrive after the race has finished, and arriving later seldom restores what the gap took.
“My house went up, so I won.” Against a wage earner, you did, and that gain is real. What you can’t easily do is spend it.24 You’d have to sell and leave the housing market altogether, because you still need somewhere to live and the house you’d move to inflated with it. Measured in houses you’re standing still, and your children buy in at the higher multiple of a salary that your gain is made of.25 The number rose. What you can spend, while you still need a roof, mostly didn’t.
“Then tax the rich and claw it back.” That attacks the symptom while the tap stays open. As long as new money keeps entering through assets first, asset prices outrun taxes. Whatever a tax takes from the people who own assets, the next round of new money lifts their assets again and pushes up the prices everyone else pays, so the gap between asset owners and wage earners is rebuilt. That’s true however the tax is designed, because a tax attacks the effect, and the new money is the mechanism that keeps widening the gap.
The ruler moves too
The reason this is so hard to see is that we measure everything in the unit being created. The official measure of prices can tell you roughly how much the pound stretched against the goods it prices. What it can’t show you is how far those goods would have fallen under a unit nobody can expand, because it does all its sums in the same stretched pound. Flip the measurement to something nobody can make more of at will, and the picture turns upside down. Bitcoin is the first money that lets you flip it. Priced that way, and read across whole cycles of bitcoin’s own swings rather than year to year, the trend in houses and shares has been down for years. So the printed money went into the numbers. The value went from wages and savings to whoever stood closest to the door. And “everything going up” was mostly the ruler shrinking.
Sources 25
What this essay rests on, as checked on 16 October 2026.
- 1 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, McLeay, Radia and Thomas, “Money creation in the modern economy”, 14 March 2014: "Just as taking out a new loan creates money, the repayment of bank loans destroys money." "The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or 'quantitative easing'." Bank of England, Explainer, “What is quantitative easing?”: "like other central banks, we can create money digitally in the form of 'central bank reserves'. We use these reserves to buy bonds."
- 2 Bank of England, Explainer, “What is quantitative easing?”: "When we buy bonds, their price tends to increase"; "QE increases the price of financial assets other than bonds, such as equities." Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2012 Q3, “The distributional effects of asset purchases”, 12 July 2012: "By pushing up a range of asset prices, asset purchases have boosted the value of households' financial wealth held outside pension funds." Miles and Monro, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 837, “UK house prices and three decades of decline in the risk-free real interest rate”, 20 December 2019: "the rise in house prices relative to incomes between 1985 and 2018 can be more than accounted for by the substantial decline in the real risk-free interest rate observed over the period"
- 3 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”: "97% of the money held by the public is in the form of deposits with banks"; "the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans".
- 4 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”: "the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans"; "The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or 'quantitative easing'." Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, April 2017, “The role of banks, non-banks and the central bank in the money creation process”: Banks create deposits when they extend credit, and repayment eliminates deposits.
- 5 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”, published 14 March 2014: “the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans” Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, April 2017, on the role of banks, non-banks and the central bank in the money creation process: Banks create deposits when they extend credit; repayment of the credit eliminates the deposits.
- 6 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”, published 14 March 2014: “the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans”; the article also prints “97% of the money held by the public is in the form of deposits with banks”.
- 7 Bank of England (McLeay, Radia and Thomas), Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, “Money creation in the modern economy”, published 14 March 2014: “The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or 'quantitative easing'.”
- 8 Bank of England, Quantitative easing explainer page: “like other central banks, we can create money digitally in the form of 'central bank reserves'. We use these reserves to buy bonds.” Purchases totalled £895 billion: £875 billion gilts plus £20 billion corporate bonds.
- 9 Bank of England, Bank Rate history and data, Bank of England Database: Bank Rate: 0.50% from 5 March 2009, 0.25% August 2016, 0.50% November 2017, 0.75% August 2018, 0.25% then 0.10% March 2020, held until 0.25% on 16 December 2021. This is the policy rate paid on commercial bank reserves, not the interest paid on investors' cash.
- 10 Joyce, Liu and Tonks, Bank of England Working Paper No. 510, “Institutional investor portfolio allocation, quantitative easing and the global financial crisis”, 2014: “QE led to institutional investors shifting their portfolios away from gilts towards corporate bonds relative to the counterfactual”, and “the shift into corporate bonds was quite widespread”.
- 11 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2012 Q3, “The distributional effects of asset purchases”, 12 July 2012: “By pushing up a range of asset prices, asset purchases have boosted the value of households' financial wealth held outside pension funds”.
- 12 Office for National Statistics, Consumer price inflation, UK: December 2022: CPI rose 5.4% in the 12 months to December 2021 and 10.5% in the 12 months to December 2022; “Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices rose by 16.9% in the 12 months to December 2022”. ONS, Consumer price inflation, UK: October 2021: “The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 4.2% in the 12 months to October 2021”; “This is the highest 12-month inflation rate since November 2011, when the CPI annual inflation rate was 4.8%.” This measures the gap since CPI was last that high, just under ten years, and the page says nothing about money creation.
- 13 ONS, Consumer price inflation, UK: September 2022: “Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices rose by 14.6% in the 12 months to September 2022, up from 13.1% in August”, having risen “for the last 14 consecutive months, from negative 0.6% in July 2021”. The rise runs from August 2021 through 2022, and the page prints food prices only.
- 14 Bernanke and Blanchard, Brookings, “What caused the U.S. pandemic-era inflation?”, June 2023: “most of the rise in inflation in 2021 and 2022 was driven by developments that directly raised prices rather than wages”, including commodity prices and supply chain kinks. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2022, chapter II, “Inflation: a look under the hood”: The chapter covers the shift from services to goods, bottlenecks, energy and food prices, and how relative price changes can broaden into inflation. Shapiro, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF Economic Letter 2022-15, “How Much Do Supply and Demand Drive Inflation?”, 21 June 2022: “Supply factors explain about half of the run-up in current inflation levels. Demand factors are responsible for about one-third, with the remainder resulting from ambiguous factors.”
- 15 Joyce, Liu and Tonks, Bank of England Working Paper No. 510, 2014, “Institutional investor portfolio allocation, quantitative easing and the global financial crisis”: "QE led to institutional investors shifting their portfolios away from gilts towards corporate bonds"; "the shift into corporate bonds was quite widespread".
- 16 Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks, “The Legacy of Milton and Rose Friedman”, 24 October 2003: "at a horizon of twelve to eighteen months the effects of a monetary expansion or contraction are felt primarily on the rate of inflation."
- 17 Bunn, Pugh and Yeates, Bank of England, Staff working paper, 2018, “The distributional impact of monetary policy easing in the UK between 2008 and 2014”: "households around retirement age gained the most from the support to wealth, but that support to incomes disproportionately benefited the young".
- 18 Office for National Statistics, Household total wealth in Great Britain: April 2020 to March 2022: Great Britain, April 2020 to March 2022: "Net property wealth made up the largest proportion of household wealth (40%), followed by private pension wealth (35%)".
- 19 Office for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2025: England 2025: median home £300,000, 7.6 times median full-time employee earnings of £39,300; at the 1997 start of the series, England and Wales, about 3.6 times annual gross full-time earnings. The figures cover England and Wales, not Britain.
- 20 Federal Reserve, Money Stock Measures, H.6 releases, 2020 and 2021: M2, billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted: $15,302.4 billion (December 2019) and $19,129.5 billion (December 2020), a rise of about $3.8 trillion in the 2020 year. The releases print about $3.8 trillion, not $3.7 trillion.
- 21 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Foreign Demand for Currency and the Fed’s Balance Sheet”, May 2019: “the estimated share of currency held abroad went from around 20% prior to 1990 to 50% to 60% in present time.” Bank for International Settlements, Global liquidity indicators at end-June 2022: “Dollar credit to non-bank borrowers outside the United States stood at $13.3 trillion at quarter-end, only 1% higher than a year earlier” — $13.3 trillion at end-June 2022. Gopinath, Boz, Casas, Díez, Gourinchas and Plagborg-Møller, “Dominant Currency Paradigm”, American Economic Review, 2020: “the dollar exchange rate quantitatively dominates the bilateral exchange rate” in “price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions”; dataset of “more than 2,500 country pairs” covering “91 percent of world trade”. No sample years are stated on the page.
- 22 International Monetary Fund, Blog post, “How Countries Should Respond to the Strong Dollar”, October 2022: “such pressures are especially acute in emerging markets, reflecting higher import dependency”. The page covers only the 2022 dollar rise and prints nothing on import bills moving before American consumer prices. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2023, “I. Navigating the disinflation journey”: “The depreciation against the dollar was larger for the currencies of countries where the policy rate increased less than in the United States.” The report prints nothing on import bills preceding American consumer prices.
- 23 Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2015-09, “Mortgaging the Future?”: “The share of mortgage loans in banks' total lending portfolios averaged across 17 advanced economies including the United States has roughly doubled over the past century—from about 30% in 1900 to about 60% in 2014.” The page is an Economic Letter by the same authors rather than their study “The Great Mortgaging”, and it covers 17 advanced economies to 2014.
- 24 Mian, Rao and Sufi, Article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013: Average marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth of “5–7 cents”, estimated using the 2006 to 2009 US housing collapse. Buiter, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14204: “no pure wealth effect on consumption from a change in house prices if this represents a change in fundamental value”; such a change redistributes between those long and short housing. Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester, Article in Economica, 2009: The link between house prices and consumption is “stronger for younger than older households, contradicting the wealth channel”, pointing to common factors such as expectations.
- 25 Office for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2023: “In 2023, full-time employees in England could expect to spend around 8.3 times their annual earnings buying a home”; “affordability ratios doubled in England from the start of the series in 1997 to 2007”.